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Abstract
This paper characterizes the wage setting behavior in a
totally unionized economy under different monetary
policy rules. The wage formation strategy of the union
can be either aggressive or cooperative.. As long as the
union is fully cooperative and in the absence of
shocks, the government can completely reach its macro-
economic targets: full employment and price stability.
If, however, the union becomes aggressive, a constant
money supply rule has a nominal wage inflation bias
under certain plausible- assumptions. By changing the
rules of the game, e.g. following a nominal GNP or
price level (inflation) rule, wage demands would be
lower and the economy better off.
1. Introduction
It is well-known, by now, that discretionary or short-sighted
monetary policy can have an inflationary bias. In the presence of
distortions or market imperfections, authorities may be tempted
to" inflate surprisingly in order to raise output beyond the
natural rate [Kydland and Prescott, 1977; Barro and Gordon,
1983a]. Although this surprise effect may work once or twice, the
private sector, in general, is aware that the incentive of the
authorities is "to cheat" and forms expectations accordingly. In
the resulting Nash equilibrium, real income equals the natural
rate, but the economy bears the cost of a higher inflation than
is socially desired and optimal. Authorities can improve the
outcome by committing themselves to low inflation.
*
I, thank Peter Nunnenkamp, Rainer Schweickert and Joachim
Scheide for valuable comments on an earlier draft. The usual
disclaimer applies.
For the use of terminology see Blanchard and Fischer, 1989, p.
595.By identifying the precommitted solution with a rule, Kydland and
Prescott [1977] established a much stronger case for rules than,
the pre-1977 arguments. The earlier case for rules was, to a,
large extent, vulnerable to the criticism that the outcome of any .
rule could also be reached by discretion. Nevertheless, the
case is not for a simple constant money growth rate a la Friedman
per se. On the one hand, the potential benefits of discretion may
not be ignored, but on the other hand, a number of alternative,
nominal anchors have been proposed during the last 15 years,,
including a nominal income rule, price rules or even the inter-
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national coordination of rules.
To compare theoretically various monetary policy rules, their
capacity to absorb unpredictable shocks - demand or supply, real .
or monetary, temporary or permanent, and country-specific or .
world-wide - plays a central role [e.g. Fukuda and Hamada, 1988;
Frankel and Chinn, 1991]. In fact, Rogoff [1985, p. 1186]
stresses that if the analysis is restricted to rigid targeting
regimes, where policy-makers are able to make binding commitments
and to hit their targets accurately, the ranking of alternative .
nominal anchors depends crucially on these conventional stabili-
zation properties.
In these standard frameworks, however, aggregate supply (employ-.-,
ment) depends on the discrepancy between the actual and the
expected price level (inflation rate). This "Phillips curve" type,,
of relationship can be justified by assuming price rigidities,
e.g. nominal wages for period t (w ) are set at the end of period
t-1 before shocks are revealed [Gray, 1976]. The crucial issue
that remains is what assumption to make with regard to wage
setting (price expectations). The usual explicit or implicit
assumption is that with a precommitted authority to a zero infla-
A recent survey of the rules versus discretion debate is e.g.
given by Fischer [1988].
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Empirical analyses/simulations are rare. Examples include
McCallum [1987], Scheide [1989], Frankel [1991].tion target and in the absence of shocks, wage agreements are
compatible with price stability and full employment. This wage
setting behavior can be called "cooperative". By way of contrast,
unions sometimes apparently try to increase real wage above the
full employment real wage. This wage formation behavior can be
called aggressive.
The principal difference between this paper and previous monetary
stabilization analyses derives from alternative specifications of
the union's loss function. In particular, it is distinguished
between cooperative and aggressive unions. The basic hypothesis
is that the optimal monetary policy rule depends on the wage
negotiation behavior of labor unions and vice versa, that the
choice of a specific monetary rule influences the wage formation
process.
The analysis proceeds in three steps. Part 2 describes the inter-
action between unions and central banks as a two-player game.
Part 3 lays down the basic model, where wages are fixed before
demand and supply shocks are revealed, and illustrates the
nominal wage inflation bias of a constant money supply rule when
union wage negotiation behavior becomes aggressive. The outcome
of a constant money supply rule is compared to the outcome when
authorities target either nominal income or the price level
(inflation rate). Part 4 illustrates the importance of the
union's objective function for the appropriate choice of a
monetary policy rule by altering the union's loss function used
in Part 3. Finally, Part 5 provides a summary of the main con-
clusions .
According to this wage setting behavior, wages are fixed at
the expected price level for period t based on t-1 information
[wt =
 Et_iP4-]- Rogoff [1985] explicitly derives this relation
along with the standard aggregate supply equation, from a Cobb-
Douglas production function and competitive profit maximizing
firms.2. Unions and Central Banks; A Game Between Two Players ='
In reality, both central banks and unions are complex organi-'
zations that follow their own internal dynamics to a certain
extent. However, for our purposes, it may be an appropriate
simplification to think of each organization as a player, that
has two possible strategies [see e.g. von Weizsacker, 1978]. The
bargaining strategy of the union can be cooperative or aggres-
sive; the policy of the monetary authority can be either expan-
sionary or restrictive. The objective functions of the labor
union and the central bank differ. If price stability is the"
1"
major objective of the monetary authority, monetary policy tends
to be restrictive, independent of the union's bargaining strate-
gy. If higher real wage is the major objective of the union, its
bargaining strategy tends to be aggressive, independent of the
strategy of the monetary authority. The final outcome of the game
is a relatively restrictive monetary policy and a relatively
aggressive union wage policy, which tend to reduce employment and "
increase inflation. This result represents a non-cooperative
equilibrium. Both the monetary authority and the union might
prefer the outcome of a situation where monetary policy is
slightly less restrictive and the union more cooperative.
Due to the complexity of the game in reality a cooperative"'
solution is rather unlikely. However, a more satisfactory result
of the game might be possible if the rules of the game are
2
changed. The effects of alternative rules will be analyzed
subsequently.
Recent German wage agreements (on average above 5 per cent) at
a time of slowing real growth in the West might be interpreted
as an example of aggressive labor union behavior.
2
In connection with his verbal description of this prisoner's
dilemma kind of structure, von Weizsacker [1978] was, besides
Meade [19 78], one of the first economists to propose targeting
nominal income instead of money supply.3. The Basic Model
The single-period loss function of the union is quadratic in the
deviation of real wage, [w. - p. ], from a target level, and in
1 the deviation of output from the natural rate, y.:
[1] L£ = £ [w. - p - a] + y. t'
where £ is the weight assigned to the real wage objective.
Throughout, subscript t denotes time and lower case letters de-
note natural logarithms. A bar indicates that nominal wages (w )
are set in advance. Furthermore, all variables are expressed in
deviations from their equilibrium levels. The target level of
real wage exceeds the full employment real wage by a [Tabellini,
2
1988]. The assumption that a > 0 is crucial. A plausible justi-
fication comes from political economy. Unions are not necessarily
concerned to the same degree with employed and unemployed union
members and their respective incomes. For a given a (a > 0), a
union is considered as aggressive i-f /$ > 0. If /3 = 0, the union
is fully cooperative and the achievement of the authority's final
targets, full employment and price stability, is not jeopardized
from the beginning. The loss function of the authority (social
To simplify algebra without loss of generality, the loss
function is assumed to be quadratic [see e.g. Blanchard and
€Fischer, 1989; Frankel and Chinn, 1991] and real economic
-activity is taken as a convenient proxy for employment.
2
In contrast to Tabellini [1988, p. 104] the quadratic function
of output is added to the loss function [1]. Dropping this term
would change the expected losses of the union and artificially
favor a price rule from the union's perspective. An overview of
alternative trade union objective functions and the main
criticisms of the widely adopted method of treating unions as
profit maximizers or, equivalently, as loss minimizers is given
by Chapman [1986] .
-A recent game theoretical model (without the distinction
between a cooperative and aggressive union), where the union
wants to maximize its "expected" real wage bill, is presented
by Bieta and Straub [1991].loss function), which is used to assess the effects of alterna
tive monetary rules, simply is
where $ > 0 is the authority's weight assigned to price stabi-
lity.
Wages are negotiated at the end of period t-1 for period t and
workers agree to supply whatever amount of labor is demanded by
firms at the negotiated wage rate. Therefore, in period t employ-r.
ment is completely determined by demand [Gray, 1976]. Further-
more, it is assumed that the union is strong, in the sense that
the final negotiated wage rate (w ) is identical to the union's
preferred nominal wage rate. This may be interpreted either as,
pure wage setting or as an assumption that the union's weapons
(e.g. strikes) and its bargaining tactics are sufficient to
ultimately reach the desired outcome.
Because of the type of wage contract, aggregate supply [3]
depends on the discrepancy between the actual price level and the
negotiated wage rate, as well as on a transitory aggregate supply
disturbance u with u '-~'N(O,a
2 ) .
[3] yt = 8 (pt - wt) with 5 > 0.
_-Instituting [3] in [1] the loss function of the union is:
[4] L^ = £ [wt - pt - a]' + [S(pt- wt) + ut]
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Assuming that the economy was in the cooperative equilibrium in
t-1, the authority's price level target is equivalent here to a
zero inflation target. Contrary to common practice in dynamic
inconsistency models, it is not necessary to build in an
"additional" inflationary bias in the authority's loss function
[e.g. Blanchard and Fischer, 1989; Frankel and Chinn, 1991],
because this is already implicitly done by the choice of the
union's loss function if 3 > 0 (along with a given a > 0).Constant Money Supply Rule
The authority announces that it will follow a constant money
supply rule. Although it is no easy task to impose an external
mechanism that effectively ties the hands of the policy-maker, it
is assumed that this precommitment is credible and irrevocable.
Credibility could e.g. be supported by effectively indexing the
annual salaries of central bankers to their success in hitting
the targets [e.g. Neumann/ 1991] or by introducing an appropriate
law. Under a constant money rule the aggregate demand equation
may be described by [see e.g. Dornbusch and Frankel, 1987]
[5] yt = x (mt - pt) + vt
where v is a transitory demand shock, v—N (0,a
2), which e.g.
may be interpreted as a disturbance in the public's demand for
money or as a shift in intertemporal consumption preferences. The
disturbances v and u are assumed to be independent and serially
uncorrelated.
The union sets the wage so as to minimize its expected loss from
[4] under the condition that the authority follows a constant






 = ^ wage
demands are not influenced by shocks. Therefore, the expected




 wt " x
where superscript M denotes wage under money supply targeting.
The more aggressive unions are (larger fi) or the smaller the
absolute value of the price elasticity of aggregate demand (x)
the higher nominal wage settings. Given w , using [3] and [5],
the resulting price level, real wage and output are
The second-order conditions for a minimum are met. Given the
quadratic form of the loss function, the minimum is global.- fH
 + ^ I't - V
[6c] 5? -
The result indicates that under a constant money supply rule the
authority's target, full employment and price stability, can only
be reached as long as the union is fully cooperative ((3 = 0) and
there are no shocks (u = v = 0). Under these circumstances,
both the union's and the authority's loss function are minimized
u A (L = L. = 0). However, if the union is aggressive the authority
can no longer reach its targets. In the absence of shocks,
inflation (the price level) is higher than socially desired and
real income below the natural rate. This outcome, however,
reflects the preference of the union exactly.
Nominal Income Rule
Now the outcome will be compared to the case where the monetary
authority follows a nominal income rule and is supposed to be
able to target nominal income accurately, which implies that
[7] yt + pt = c,
where c denotes the policy determined level of nominal income.
Assuming that the authority wants to keep nominal income at its
equilibrium level c = 0, the union sets the wage - so as to
minimize its expected loss from [4] under the condition of [7] -
at
For a recent survey see e.g. Argy [1991].foal ^N _ [8a] wt -
where superscript N denotes nominal income targeting.
A comparison of [6a] and [8a] already shows that nominal wage
claims under both rules are only identical if x = 1, This re-
flects that the slope of both aggregate demand curves (see [5]
and [7]) are identical if x = 1. Empirical results, however,
suggest that under a money supply rule the absolute value of the
price elasticity of aggregate demand is in the short run smaller
than 1 (x < 1) [see e.g. Taylor, 1985]. This implies that wage
formation, measured in nominal terms, appears to be more aggres-
sive under a money supply rule than under a nominal income rule,
if the union places some weight on the real wage target.
Under a nominal income rule the resulting price level, real wage
and output are:
[8b] p ^ u
[8C] wt - pt =
ro,. N [8d] yt
As is known, a perfect nominal income rule fully absorbs all
demand shocks. Furthermore, if (3 > 0, and in the absence of
shocks the inflation rate under a nominal income rule [8b] is
lower than under a money supply rule [6b] under the assumption of
x < 1. However, the real wage increase and the income loss are
identical in both regimes. Although a nominal income rule does
not prevent real income from dropping in the absence of shocks,
inflation, in general, will differ if the union is aggressive.10
Price Level (Inflation Rate) Targeting
Now, the above results will be compared to the case where the
monetary authority targets the price level (or inflation rate),
directly. Again, it is assumed that the authority can target the'
inflation rate accurately, which, in fact, implies that money
supply changes transmit quickly and foreseeably into price level
changes.
If the monetary authority follows a strict price rule, the
nominal wage which minimizes the expected loss from [4] is given
by:
[9a]
where superscript P denotes a price rule. Obviously, nominal wage
demands are lower under a rigid price rule than under nominal
income targeting or a constant money supply rule. Since monetary
policy adjusts money supply so as to keep the price level con-
stant
[9b] pj = 0
the resulting real wage and output are:
Independent of the size of shocks the union can reach its (ex
ante) preferred real wage. Meanwhile, a supply shock is fully
transmitted to real economic activity.
To compare the effects of the alternative regimes completely the
expected losses for the union and the authority are calculated
respectively.11
Expected Losses
The expected loss of the union at the end of t-1 for period t
[E. -iL. ] under the 3 alternative regimes is calculated by substi-
tuting the results under each rule [6c-d, 8c-d, 9c-d] into the
union's loss function [1] and taking expectations. One obtains:
[10] Et-1L jgf + J^T [(A6)a£ + (0+T)a
rll1 p UN [11] Et_1Lt
where [10] describes the expected loss of the union under a
constant money rule, [11] the expected loss of the union under a
nominal income rule and [12] the expected loss of the union under
a price rule. Comparing [10], [11] and [12] reveals, that the
preferred regime on part of the union depends only on the size of
the shocks. In the absence of shocks (a
2 = a
2 = 0), the loss of
the union is identical under all three regimes. When demand
shocks are large, a nominal income or a price rule is preferable
to the union. In the case of supply shocks, the choice between a
nominal income and price rule depends on how big the effect of
surprise inflation (6) is, and how much weight 0 is placed on the
real wage target. Thus, ±f /3 > 6(2+6), the union would prefer a
price level (inflation) target to a nominal income target.
The equivalent expected losses under all three regimes for the
authority after wages are set are calculated in the same manner.
Substituting [6c-d, 8c-d, 9c-d] in the authority's loss function




n, AP [15] Et_1Lt
Equation [13] gives the expected loss of the authority under a
constant money rule, [14] the expected loss of the authority
under a nominal income rule, and [15] the expected loss of the
authority under a price rule. Obviously, as long as there are no"
shocks in the economy and the union is cooperative (£ = 0) the:
regime does not make a difference; the authority can reach both
targets - price stability and full employment - completely. -In'-
the event of shocks, the usual stabilization properties hold. A
nominal income rule or a price rule fully absorbs demand shocks.
However if /3 > 0 results differ significantly. In the absence of
shocks and under the assumption that x < 1, the authority would








M - for x < 1, a^ = a* = 0. '
Thus, in the absence of supply shocks, the authority would prefer
the outcome of a rigid price rule. The reason is, that under a
price rule the authority varies the money supply in such a way-
that a strong union reaches its real wage target with zero price-
inflation, thereby avoiding the inflationary effect of higher-
nominal wage demands under a nominal income or money supply rule.
The above results may be interpreted as an appraisal of a
"supply shock adjusted price rule".LJ i u i i o! (i e &
des Insfrifufs fiir Welfwirta
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Still, none of these rules can prevent real income from falling
below the natural rate as long as the labor union is strong and
places some weight on its real wage target.
The intuition behind the results is obvious. Under the assumption
that strong unions do not care about inflation itself, the
authority is precommitted to a certain rule, and in the absence
of shocks a strong union can select its preferred real wage -
unemployment combination. The union will demand whatever nominal
wage is necessary to reach its preferred combination. Due to
different reaction functions of the authority under alternative
regimes the resulting price level (inflation rate) will differ.
From an analytical point of view, a nominal wage increase above
the rate which is ex ante consistent with full employment and
price stability can be interpreted as a supply shock. From the
aggregate supply equation [3] can be seen that under a price
rule, an increase in wages has effects identical to a supply
shock of the size (-6w ). This illustrates the similarity between
high wage demands and supply shocks. However, the nominal size of
the "wage-supply-shock" depends on the trade union's loss func-
tion and on the policy regime.
4. The Importance of the Trade Union's Loss Function
In the above analysis, the trade union was assumed to be uncon-
cerned about the inflation rate. Although economists have not
come up with convincing arguments, as to why anticipated infla-
tion should have much direct weight in the context of a rational
expectation model, it might be argued that trade unions do care
about inflation to some extent. For an economy as a whole, the
costs of inflation include administrative costs of posting new
prices as well as the so-called "shoe leather costs of infla-
tion" . A union might prefer a specific unemployment real wage
combination at low inflation rates to an identical macroeconomic14
result with higher inflation, because unemployed labor would in
the former case be better off, as long as unemployment benefits
are not fully indexed to current inflation. Thus, as long as
unions care about their "unemployed members" to at least some
degree, the inflation rate itself may have some weight in the
union's objective function. (However, the following modification
does not depend on the union'~s weight assigned to inflation being
particularly large.)
The union's loss function [1] is changed to [1'], where £ repre-
sents the additional weight assigned to the inflation target.
[1'] L£ = £ [wt -
Now the union sets the wage as to minimize the expected loss from
[1'] under the condition that the authority follows a money
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Under a price rule results [9a-d], as well as the expected
losses, (12,15) remain the same. The respective expected losses
under a money supply and nominal income rule for the trade union
are:







The equivalent expected losses for the authority are
[13'] E L [(Jty)a mr)o^
Shocks influence the real wage, the price level, real income, and
the expected losses of the authority just as before. However, as
long as the trade union assigns at least some weight to infla-
tion, not only nominal variables, but also real wage and real
income differ under alternative regimes.
If the authority follows a strict price rule, the trade union's
weight assigned to the inflation objective does not alter the
overall outcome. However, if the authority follows either a
constant money supply or nominal income rule, and the union16
assigns some weight to inflation nominal wage demands, real wage
and the loss in income will be lower. Furthermore, a comparison
of [13'], [14'] and [15] reveals that it might be suboptimal for
the authority to follow a strict price rule if the union itself
cares about inflation.
5. Conclusions
The optimal nominal anchor depends on the wage negotiation
behavior of trade unions and, vice versa, the wage formation
process is influenced by the choice of the monetary policy rule.
As long as trade unions are cooperative and no stocks occur, the
government can reach its macroeconoinic targets: full employment
and price stability. This is true for a money supply rule and a
nominal income rule, as well as a price level (inflation) rule.
Obviously, in the presence of disturbances the conventional shock
stabilization properties hold. A rigid nominal income target, as
well as a rigid price rule, fully absorb demand shocks. In the
case of a negative supply shock, a nominal income rule divides
the shock into a fall in output and an increase in the price
level (almost) equiproportionally. In comparison, a price rule
fully transmits the shock to real economic activity (employment).
However, if trade unions become aggressive, which is defined as
assigning some weight to a real wage target above the level which
is compatible with full employment, a money supply rule has a
nominal wage inflation bias under certain plausible assumptions.
Although this inflationary bias can be reduced by changing the
rules of the game, none of the alternative anchors - nominal GNP
or prices - can prevent real income from dropping. High nominal
wage agreements by aggressive unions have effects similar to
exogenous supply shocks, such as oil price increases. Yet, the
nominal size of the "wage-shock" crucially depends on the speci-
fic monetary rule followed by the authorities.17
In order to focus on the main message - the interdependence
of trade unions' behavior and monetary policy rules - it seemed
appropriate to choose a rather simple framework. In particular,
this analysis was restricted to the consideration of rigid rules,
which are by no means easy to implement. The alternative of a
fully discretionary regime and reputational factors that can play
a major role in multiperiod ~settings [e.g. Barro and Gordon,
1983b] were not explicitly considered. In the one period frame-
work presented here, discretion would dominate the alternative
2
rules under certain assumptions.
Last but not least, it has to be mentioned that a crucial assump-
tion in the above analysis is that the union's weight assigned to
the real wage objective is invariant with respect to the policy
regime. However, in reality, it may not be excluded that the
weight /3 changes under alternative policies, because the percep-
tion of the wage-unemployment trade-off between alternative
regimes may differ. Nevertheless, the main point of this paper,
that the optimal monetary policy rule depends on the wage nego-
tiation behavior of labor unions and vice versa, that the choice
of a specific monetary policy rule influences the wage formation
process, should extend to a more sophisticated setting.
In a multiperiod setting the change over time in the union's
.aggressivity would be of crucial importance.
2
The benefits of being able to react flexibly to exogenous
shocks have to outweigh the costs of the nominal wage inflation
bias of a discretionary policy. See e.g. Frankel and Chinn
[1991] for a comparison between rules and discretion in a
structural framework where trade unions are (implicitly) fully
cooperative.18
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